We report data from eight participants who made alignment judgements between a moving object and a stationary, continuously visible 'landmark'. A reversing object had to overshoot the landmark by a signiWcant amount in order to appear to reverse aligned with it. In addition, an adjacent Xash irrelevant to the judgment task reliably increased this illusory 'foreshortening'. This and other results are most simply explained by a model in which the Xash causes attentional capture, complemented by processes of temporal integration, or backward inhibition, and object representation. A Xash used to probe the perception of a moving object's position disrupts that very perception.
Introduction
Illusions involving the misperception of a moving object's position have both inspired the development of models of motion perception, and allowed discrimination amongst them. This is particularly true of the Xash-lag illusion: the misperception whereby a moving object spatially leads a Xashed object when they are displayed in alignment (reviewed by Krekelberg & Lappe, 2001; Nijhawan, 2002; Ögmen, Patel, Bedell, & Camuz, 2004; Schlag & Shlag-Rey, 2002; Whitney, 2002) , and to a lesser extent the Fröhlich illusion: the misperception of the point of appearance of a moving object in the direction of its motion (Kirschfeld, 2006; Müsseler, Stork, & Kerzel, 2002; Whitney, 2002) . In the present work we measured the Fröhlich illusion, by comparing the perceived point of appearance of a moving object with that of a stationary stimulus, and also measured a similar illusion involving the perceived point of reversal of a moving object (which followed what we term a reversal trajectory). Within the same experiment we also measured the Xash-lag illusion with these trajectories, reasoning that such a combination would provide stronger constraints on models of motion perception than previous data derived from diVerent experiments (cf. Kreegipuu & Allik, 2003; Müsseler et al., 2002) . Both illusions, after all, involve comparing the moving object's perceived position with that of another stimulus, be it a Xash in the Xash-lag paradigm, or a stationary stimulus such as we used to measure the Fröh-lich illusion.
1 It is most parsimonious to assume that the same basic processes underlie position computation for the moving object in both the Xash-lag and Fröhlich illusions, although the outcome of these processes may be inXuenced by other stimuli. Indeed one of the main conclusions of the current work is that the Xash-lag Xash has just such an eVect on computation of the moving object's position.
In the experiment reported here, a number of moving object trajectories and alignment judgments have been incorporated in a single within-subjects design. We are therefore able to measure the relative magnitude of the illusions across conditions independent of the reported variations among observers (see Kreegipuu & Allik, 2003) . The experiment was designed to test the temporal integration model of moving object visual position determination as well as the attention-capturing eVect of the Xash. Research in both areas is reviewed below.
Temporal integration
Temporal integration (Morgan & Watt, 1983 ) is the main process in the model proposed by Lappe and Krekelberg (1998; Krekelberg & Lappe, 2000) , but was also included in models proposed by Sejnowski (2000a, 2000b) and Whitney, Murakami, and Cavanagh (2000) . Temporal integration assumes that the perception of the instantaneous position of a moving object is based on an integration over the positions it occupies during some period of time-the window of integration.
Given this process, it is easy to see why an object suddenly appearing and moving oV with constant velocity would produce the Fröhlich illusion: its position will always be seen some distance from its initial location (normally indicated by a stationary reference stimulus) in the direction of its motion, assuming at least some positions occupied after its appearance are sampled, and the size of the illusion would be related to the extent of the window of integration. In an onset trajectory Xash-lag paradigm, the Xash replaces the stationary reference stimulus and is presented in the same instant as the moving object appears, with an instruction to the observer to compare its position with that of the moving object. Everything else being equal (and in particular the latency for positional processing of moving and Xashed objects being assumed to be equal, cf. Purushothaman, Patel, Bedell, & Ögmen, 1998; Whitney & Murakami, 1998) there seems no reason to assume temporal integration would yield a diVerent answer in the two paradigms-the Fröhlich and Xash-lag illusions should have equal magnitude.
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Empirical data relating to this prediction are both scarce and contradictory. Whitney and Cavanagh (2000b) found such an equality to hold, although the magnitude of the Fröhlich, but not the Xash-lag, illusion was signiWcantly reduced by introducing a 'pre-cue' to indicate where the moving object would appear. On the other hand, Müsseler et al. (2002) found a non-signiWcant Fröhlich illusion in their Experiment 2, and highly signiWcant Xash-lag illusions, of approximately 10 times the Fröhlich illusion's magnitude, in their Experiments 1 and 3. However, what they characterized as a Xash-lag paradigm required participants to move a mouse pointer to the perceived position of the moving object, which is not how it is typically measured. The current experiment provides more data relating to this contradiction. In order to motivate other conditions in our experiment, we here preview that, in agreement with Müsseler et al. (2002) , we did Wnd a diVerence between the illusions, although not such a dramatic one-the magnitude of the Fröhlich illusion in our data was just less than half that of the Xash-lag illusion. In the Discussion we analyse diVerences between our stimuli and those of Whitney and Cavanagh (2000b) which might account for our diVering results. Temporal integration alone could not account for such a diVerence between the illusions, and so we turned to considering if attention-capturing properties of the Xash might be able to do so.
Attentional capture
A suddenly appearing stimulus such as a Xash is uniquely eVective in causing reXexive, 'bottom-up' attentional capture (Egeth & Yantis, 1997; Yantis, 1996) . Baldo and Klein (1995) suggested one interpretation of their Wnding: that increasing Xash eccentricity increased the magnitude of the Xash-lag illusion, might be that attentional capture by the Xash plays a role in the Xash-lag illusion (see also Kanai, Sheth, & Shimojo, 2004) . Note, though, that such a process occurring in the Xash-lag paradigm would not Wt Yantis (1996) deWnition of attentional capture, as that required the capture to be involuntary-occurring in spite of the intention of the participant. On the other hand, the Xash in the Xash-lag paradigm is task-relevant.
Nevertheless, given the nature of the Xash-lag task Xash, it is likely that substantial attentional resources are transferred to it, to the detriment of processing of the moving object. We will term this task-relevant attentional capture. One consequence of this might be that the moving object is not perceived at some positions it actually occupied, and which it would otherwise have been perceived to occupy in the absence of the Xash. Thus, the Xash would have eVectively masked the moving object.
It is necessary to consider which parts of any given trajectory may be masked. Consideration of an oVset trajectory, for which the moving object disappears in the same frame that the Xash does, is helpful here. The majority of extant literature on this trajectory suggests that in a Xashlag paradigm the moving object is seen veridically at oVset (Munger & Owens, 2004; Whitney et al., 2000) . Departures from this result have been in the direction of a small overshoot, although under somewhat atypical conditions (large visual angle (>5°) between Xashed and moving object (Kanai et al., 2004) ; or with blurred stimuli (Fu, Shen, & Dan, 2001) ). If masking were of the moving object at positions it occupied before the time of the Xash then some part of the end of its trajectory should be invisible. There being no suggestion of this in the literature, we propose that if masking is occurring, it is of the moving object at positions it occupies after the time of the Xash.
A second consequence of attentional capture by the Xash might be that, having processed the Xash, with an associated dwell time of attention (Egeth & Yantis, 1997) , it may subsequently be necessary for attention to return to the moving object so that the observer may obtain more positional information about the moving object necessary to complete the Xash-lag relative position judgment (cf. Baldo, Kihara, Namba, & Klein, 2002) . Consistent with such a change in the focus of attention is the Wnding that when the moving object and Xash are perceived to overlap, such as in Khurana, Watanabe, and Nijhawan's (2000) experiments, the moving object is perceived to be on top of the Xash. This occurred in their experiments even though the moving object was black and the Xash white (Figs. 1 and 2 in Khurana et al., 2000) ! This strongly suggests that, in the sequence of sensory processes leading to perception, the moving object was processed last. The net eVect of all of these shifts in focal attention would be that a later position of the moving object would be sampled than would have been the case if the positional judgement had not been cued with a Xash.
So, any combination of the above masking and/or shifts in focal attention would predict that the Xash-lag illusion with an onset trajectory should be larger than the Fröhlich illusion, either because the Xash renders more of the trajectory invisible, and/or because attention returns to the moving object to assess its location at a later time and position than it would have done in the absence of the Xash. Unlike previous work, though, the present experiment was designed to estimate the amount of attentional capture by the Xash per se. This was achieved by using a task-irrelevant stimulus in the following way. We introduced conditions in which our participants still compared the perceived position of the moving object with that of a stationary stimulus, as in our condition measuring the Fröhlich illusion. However, in addition this task was done in the presence of a Xash similar to that which appeared in conditions measuring the Xash-lag illusion. The instructions were to ignore this Xash, and indeed it provided no information relevant to their alignment judgement. If the Xash was found to aVect the magnitude of illusion observed, we could conclude that this had occurred via attentional capture by the Xash.
Comparing illusions across trajectories, and position of the window of integration
The eVect of an irrelevant Xash was tested with all of the trajectories so far described-onset, oVset and reversal trajectories, and the Xash-lag illusion was also measured with each of these trajectories. Thus we had the opportunity to compare these illusions' magnitudes across these trajectories, and test model predictions against our Wndings in this regard. In particular, the timing of the start of the window of integration would clearly inXuence the relative sizes of the illusion perceived in each of these trajectories. In fact, Eagleman and Sejnowski (2000a) found equality for onset and reversal trajectories within the Xash-lag paradigm, and also for a straight-through trajectory, for which the moving object moved in one direction continuously across the display, and the Xash occurred near the trajectory's mid-point. They pointed out that if the start of the window was simultaneous with the Xash these equalities would be predicted, as all trajectories are the same after the Xash. It also predicts a null illusion for an oVset trajectory.
One way to elegantly account for a placement of the window of integration which includes more time after the Xash than before it is to follow Whitney et al. (2000) and combine temporal integration with the further assumption that information regarding the Xash reaches position processing areas with a longer latency than information regarding the moving object. Detectors sampled by the window corresponding to the moving object would be activated more quickly than detectors corresponding to the Xash, and so when the decision about the relative positions of the two objects is made the window of integration for the moving object would include more detectors corresponding to times after the Xash than detectors corresponding to times before it.
Others, in fact, have argued that such a diVerential latency is the most important process underlying the Xash-lag eVect (e.g., Purushothaman et al., 1998) . Recently neurophysiological studies have also provided support for this assumption, either in the form of direct 
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Onset measurement of latencies (Jancke, Erlhagen, Schöner, & Dinse, 2004) , or in the form of sub-threshold priming of visual areas 'ahead' of the moving object (Bringuier, Chavane, Glaeser, & Frégnac, 1999; Jancke et al., 2004) . The latter might be expected to lead to a reduced latency in processing the moving object when it arrived at these primed areas.
To test this, in the current experiment conditions were run in which participants compared the perceived onset time of a Xash with the perceived time of a critical event in a moving object's trajectory-an onset, oVset, or a reversal. In fact, Nijhawan, Watanabe, Khurana, and Shimojo (2004) have already found that for an onset trajectory the Xash has a reliable temporal advantage. This casts doubt on the plausibility of diVerential latency contributing to the Xash-lag illusion with this trajectory. The phenomenology of Khurana et al.'s (2000) experiment, where the moving object is perceived on top of the Xash, also suggest the moving object is seen later than the Xash with a straightthrough trajectory. To further test the diVerential latency account, we included temporal order judgment conditions with all trajectories for which it was possible.
One problem with the temporal integration and diVerential latency model outlined above is that, contradicting Eagleman and Sejnowski's (2000a) result, at least two studies have found the Xash-lag illusion to be signiWcantly larger with an onset trajectory than with a straight-through trajectory (Ögmen et al., 2004; Patel, Ogmen, Bedell, & Sampath, 2000) . The current experiment's design allows for a direct within-subject comparison of the magnitude of the illusion using these two trajectories.
Experiment overview
In some conditions, participants compared the perceived position of the moving object with respect to a stationary stimulus at the time an event occurred in its trajectory, for example, a reversal. This we termed a landmark judgment (cf. Hine, White, & Chappell, 2003) . In all cases, the stationary stimulus was the Wxation cross-hairs. This judgment was performed with onset, oVset and reversal moving object trajectories. With these three trajectories we also had landmark irrelevant Xash judgment conditions, in which participants made the same positional comparison as in landmark judgments, but in the presence of an irrelevant Xash. To provide data on the relative timing of perception of these events with these three trajectories we also required temporal order judgments (TOJs) between an event in the trajectory: onset, oVset or reversal, and a reference Xash. Finally, with each of these three trajectories, as well as with a straightthrough trajectory, participants made 'standard' Xash-lag judgments, comparing the relative positions of the moving object and a Xash, when the Xash occurred. There were thus thirteen experimental conditions in all (two additional control conditions are described in the Procedure).
Methods

Participants
Ten naive participants and two of the authors were tested. Their ages ranged from 18 to 46 years old. All participants possessed normal or corrected-to-normal vision. An important feature of our experimental design was within participant comparisons of magnitudes of eVects, particularly across the spatial conditions. Therefore, we wished to ensure that our estimates of participants' PSEs were valid and reliable. One participant was rejected midway through their Wrst main session, as it was judged that they were not following instructions conscientiously. Three further participants were excluded from the analyses reported here, either because the statistical procedure could not provide estimates of conWdence intervals for one or two particular conditions (g 7 1, Finney, 1971 ), for them, or because they were deemed to have unacceptably large conWdence intervals in a particular condition.
3 Examination of trial-by-trial response data revealed that these participants were not responding consistently in these conditions, and thus we concluded they were not consistently following instructions. Therefore, the procedure was not producing valid or reliable estimates of their illusion magnitudes for these conditions.
Stimuli
Stimuli were displayed in a darkened room on a 14 in. Ultra VGA 1024 computer monitor of 640 £ 480 pixel resolution. To ensure accuracy in both the velocity and timings of the stimuli, the vertical refresh rate of the monitor was determined to be 60 Hz, using a photodiode triggered by the Wrst scan line of each frame and displayed on a Tektronix ® Model TDS2024 Digital Storage Oscilloscope.
A chin rest for participants was used to keep a constant viewing distance of 55 cm. Both the Xashed and moving stimuli consisted of a 'doubletriangle' object as shown in Fig. 1 . This shape ensured symmetry about the direction of motion no matter whether the object was moving left or right-important in the reversal conditions. In addition, the twin vertices aided spatial alignment judgements with both the Xashed stimuli and the Wxation mark. We (Chappell & Hine, 2004) have previously used triangles with a vertical edge, to facilitate accurate spatial judgements-the stimulus used here provided such vertical edges for both directions of movement. The moving object (Fig. 1A and B) was 4° across its base and 1.88° in height with a luminance of 101 cd/m 2 and its two upper vertices had a separation of 1° of visual angle. It moved at a constant 11.7°/s. The vertical cross-hair lines in the Wxation stimulus were also 1° apart and were 0.3° in height. Participants were instructed to always maintain gaze on this Wxation stimulus. The Xashed object (upper object in Fig. 1B ) had a width of 6.4°, a height of 3.38° (luminance; 128 cd/m 2 ) and its two lower vertices were also separated by 1°. It was somewhat larger than the moving stimulus, also to facilitate accurate spatial judgments. The monitor background luminance was less than 0.3 cd/m 2 . All luminance levels were averages of a number of measures using a Tektronix ® J18 1° luminance probe.
Procedure
The moving object in Fig. 1 followed one of the four diVerent trajectories already described: straight-through, onset, oVset, and reversal. For the latter three trajectories the salient event always occurred near the Wxation point, which was near the centre of the screen. For half of the trials for each trajectory the initial movement of the object was to the left; for the other half movement was toward the right. These directions were randomly chosen.
Participants were required to make several diVerent types of judgements. The Wrst three were judgments of spatial alignment. Following the standard Xash-lag paradigm, the position of the Xashed object was compared with the position of the moving object. In the landmark judgement conditions, the position of the moving object was compared with that of the stationary Wxation stimulus (Fig. 1) , which was always visible. This was also the case for landmark irrelevant Xash conditions, but these also contained a Xashed object, which was totally irrelevant to the landmark alignment task at hand, and which participants were instructed to ignore. In this case, the Xashed object occupied random positions similar to those it occupied in trials of the Xash-lag judgment condition. Finally, the participant was also required to make judgements of temporal order comparing the time of appearance of the Xash with the time of critical events in the moving object's trajectory: its appearance, disappearance, or reversal. These four judgment conditions were used for each of the four diVerent trajectories with the exception of the straight-through trajectory. In the latter, since the moving object was unchanged for the duration of a trial, the landmark, landmark irrelevant Xash, and temporal judgements were logically excluded and only the Xash-lag judgment was tested.
Participants used left and right arrow keys on a keyboard to indicate their two-alternate, forced-choice judgments (2AFC). In the Xash-lag condition, participants responded with the right arrow if they saw the lower vertices of the Xash to the right of the corresponding upper vertices of the moving object (Fig. 1B) or with the left arrow if they saw the Xashed object's vertices to the left of the corresponding moving object's vertices. They were instructed to make this judgment at the time they perceived the Xash. In landmark judgment conditions, if at either the reversal, appearance or disappearance of the moving object its vertices were perceived to be to the left of the corresponding Wxation stimulus cross-hairs, the left arrow was pressed (Fig. 1A) . On the other hand, if moving object's vertices were perceived to be to the right of the corresponding Wxation stimulus cross-hairs, the right arrow was pressed (Fig. 1B, ignoring upper Xash stimulus). Finally, in the temporal judgments, the left arrow was pressed if the Xashed object was seen to occur before either the reversal, appearance or disappearance of the moving object and the right arrow was pressed for judgments of the Xash occurring after these events. To control for response biases in participants' responding with the left and right keys, control conditions were run for both the Xash-lag and temporal judgements. In the former, alignment judgements were made between a Xashed object and a stationary object (lower object in Fig. 1B ) and in the latter participants responded to the order of two Xashes.
An adaptive method of constant stimuli was used in all conditions. For example, in the landmark reversal condition, to determine where the reversal point had to occur in order for participants to perceive it to be aligned with the Wxation stimulus (the 'point of subjective alignment', or PSA), a Wxed set of nine moving object-Wxation oVsets was Wrst tested where, a priori, these oVsets spanned most participants' PSAs. Then, after approximately every nine trials per condition for each participant, a logistic regression (Finney, 1971) was performed on the data in order to provide the next estimate of the PSA. A new set of nine oVsets were then generated spanning this revised PSA, and further data were gathered and the whole process repeated. In the case of the temporal judgements, nine diVerent temporal oVsets were used in the same way to obtain a point of subjective simultaneity (PSS). The process of adapting the oVsets was carried out by the presentation software, so that participants experienced a short pause (1-2 s) between trial presentations while it occurred.
Overall, approximately 162 trials per condition contributed to each PSA or PSS for each participant. A negligible number of trials were timed out after 2 s if there was no keyboard response. Judgments of the three main types: both landmark and landmark irrelevant Xash, Xash-lag, and temporal were blocked, and the order of blocks was counterbalanced across and within participants. Text displayed on the screen warned the participant of the trajectory and judgment type to be presented in the proceeding trial. Conditions were fully randomized within each block. Data was gathered in a pilot and three main sessions in the laboratory for each participant, with each session lasting up to an hour that included rest periods as deemed necessary. Data from each and every condition were gathered within each session.
Results
Null results in the control conditions indicated no response bias in Xash-lag and temporal judgments. For each participant and each condition, the frequency-ofresponding (2AFC) data were combined from the three main sessions and Wtted with a logistic regression to yield overall PSAs and PSSs along with conWdence intervals. Mean PSAs across participants are shown in Fig. 2 , with mean PSSs being converted to spatial oVsets using the speed of the moving object as a conversion factor.
For landmark judgment conditions, there was a signiWcant Fröhlich illusion with the onset trajectory (t (7) D 3.58, p D 0.009, two-tailed, one-sample t-test comparing the mean with zero) and the moving object was perceived to signiWcantly 'undershoot' the Wxation stimulus for the reversal trajectory (t (7) D 4.97, p D 0.002, two-tailed, one-sample). The diVerence between the onset and reversal trajectories was not signiWcant (t (7) D 1.01, p D 0.31, two-tailed) with landmark judgments. Thus, a signiWcant part of both these trajectories was invisible to the observer.
To examine the eVect of the presence of the Xash-irrelevant or otherwise-on the alignment judgment tasks, a 2 (trajectory type ¡ onset vs reversal) £ 3 (judgment type ¡ landmark no Xash vs landmark irrelevant Xash vs Xash-lag) ANOVA was performed. The interaction was not signiWcant, neither was the eVect of trajectory type, but the eVect of judgment type was signiWcant (F (2, 6) D 16.0, 4 p D 0.004). To test in a pair-wise fashion which judgment types gave signiWcantly diVerent illusion magnitudes, a series of three 2 £ 2 ANOVAs tested for the eVects of judgment type, with trajectory type (onset vs reversal) always being the other factor. No interactions were signiWcant. One 2 (trajectory type ¡ onset vs reversal) £ 2 (judgment type ¡ landmark no Xash vs landmark irrelevant Xash) ANOVA showed that the landmark irrelevant Xash judgment yielded a signiWcantly larger illusion than the landmark condition (F (1,7) D 21.78, p D 0.002). Another 2 (trajectory type ¡ onset vs reversal) £ 2 (judgment type ¡ landmark irrelevant Xash vs Xash-lag) ANOVA showed that the diVerence between illusion magnitudes with landmark irrelevant Xash judgments and the Xashlag judgments was not signiWcant (F (1, 7) D 4.41, p D 0.074). A Wnal 2 (trajectory type ¡ onset vs reversal) £ 2 (judgment type ¡ landmark no Xash vs Xash-lag) ANOVA showed that the illusion with Xash-lag judgments was signiWcantly larger than that with landmark judgments (F (1,7) D 11.18, p D 0.012).
For the onset trajectory, the landmark illusion magnitude was 47% of the Xash-lag magnitude, and adding the irrelevant Xash accounted for a further 17%. In remarkable agreement with these proportions, for the reversal trajectory, the landmark illusion was 46% of the Xash-lag illusion, whilst the irrelevant Xash accounted for another 18%. This suggests that the same processes are at work in the perception of both trajectories.
For Xash-lag judgments, there was no diVerence between the reversal and straight-through trajectories (t (7) D 0.51), however the illusion was bigger for the onset trajectory than either of a straight-through trajectory (t (7) D 5.00, p D 0.002, two-tailed) or a reversal trajectory (t (7) D 2.89, p D 0.023, two-tailed).
For the temporal order judgements, none of the mean PSSs were signiWcantly diVerent from zero, although that for the onset trajectory came closest (t (7) D 1.4, p D 0.1, 1-tailed).
Discussion
Landmark judgments
We found a signiWcant Fröhlich illusion with our onset trajectory. For the reversal trajectory a signiWcant portion of the trajectory around the reversal point (»0.33°) was also invisible, 5 and in fact the illusions with these two trajectories were not signiWcantly diVerent in magnitude. As noted in the Introduction, temporal integration predicts a Fröhlich illusion. It should be clear that it also predicts our result with a reversal trajectory-the average of any sample of positions around the reversal point cannot ever be at the reversal point if the window of integration is of non-zero magnitude.
An important issue for temporal integration is the placement in time of the window of integration. Within the Xash-lag paradigm, having the beginning of the window simultaneous with, or initiated by, the Xash predicts equality of the Xash-lag illusion in various trajectories (Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000a) , which as reviewed above, is at least approximately correct. For our landmark judgments there was no Xash. Instead the onset or reversal events were the cues to make a positional judgment. The corresponding assumption, to that proposed by Eagleman and Sejnowski (2000a) for the Xash-lag paradigm, would be that the window of integration starts with these events. This assumption would account for our non-signiWcant diVerence between illusions with landmark judgments, with either onset or reversal trajectories. Having the window of integration initiated by the trajectory event would also account for our null illusion with the oVset trajectory (the integral would then only include the Wnal position at which the moving object was presented). 6 Indeed if any positions prior to the point of disappearance were sampled, temporal integration would predict that perception of the moving object would fall short of its point of disappearance, and as mentioned earlier, this has not been found to occur. Hence, the asymmetry in placement of the window of temporal integration, with respect to these events, accounts for the asymmetry in illusions found with onset and oVset trajectories.
The combination of our null illusion for the oVset trajectory and signiWcant illusion with a reversal trajectory is an intriguing result. For, if the moving object had not reversed, and instead had just terminated, all of its trajectory would have been visible. The fact that it did reverse apparently caused a portion of the trajectory that would have been visible to become invisible. It is as if the moving object backward masked a portion of its own trajectory. This is a convenient junction at which to note that Kirschfeld and Kammer (1999) hypothesized that a region of inhibition exists in the wake of a moving object (see also Fu et al., 2001; Kanai et al., 2004; Kirschfeld, 2006; Sheth, Nijhawan, & Shimojo, 2000) , and it is this which is responsible for the Fröhlich illusion. Our result with a reversal trajectory may be viewed as another demonstration of the backward inhibitory process in action (cf. Kirschfeld, 2006) . The inhibitory process may thus be viewed as an alternative to temporal integration for inclusion in any model of these illusions.
EVect of irrelevant Xash and attentional capture in Xashlag illusion
We found that an irrelevant Xash signiWcantly increased illusions' magnitudes measured with a landmark judgment with both onset and reversal trajectories. Kerzel (2003) and Müsseler et al. (2002) have found similar eVects in rather diVerent paradigms, but our result is novel for participants indicating the relative positions of stimuli simultaneously presented in the display. For comparison, Kerzel (2003) tested only an oVset trajectory, and his participants compared the point of disappearance of a moving object with that of a probe which appeared 260 ms later. The eVect again becomes evident in Müsseler et al.'s (2002) data by comparing the results of their Experiments 2 and 3. However, they required participants to move a mouse pointer to the point of appearance for an onset trajectory only. Changing the task in this way can lead to diVering results (Whitney, 2002) .
If we reasonably interpret the increased illusion magnitude in this condition as poorer performance in the landmark judgment task, then our Wnding Wts Yantis ' (1996; Egeth & Yantis, 1997 ) deWnition of attentional capture as participants were clearly instructed to ignore the Xash in this condition. We also note that neither of the other processes described above and posited to underlie visual computation of position-temporal integration, or backward inhibition by a moving object, could account for this Wnding. Now, as already noted, in our Xash-lag conditions the Xash was task-relevant, and so redirection of attention to it could not Wt Yantis ' (1996; Egeth & Yantis, 1997) deWnition of attentional capture. The important point, however, is whether or not attention does move to the Xash, not how we might classify that movement. If the Xash stimulus properties are such as to cause involuntary attentional shift as our irrelevant Xash results suggest, then attentional movement to the Xash is surely even more likely when it is taskrelevant. Of course the latter is true in the standard Xashlag paradigm where bottom-up and top-down processes are likely to contribute to the attentional movement.
Our data does not allow us to discriminate between the masking and attentional movement processes. However, the fact that the irrelevant Xash had no eVect with an oVset trajectory is consistent with our assertion that any masking caused by the attentional capture would be of the moving object at positions occupied after the Xash. Baldo and Klein (1995) proposed that attentional capture plays a role in the Xash-lag illusion. We conclude that stimulus-driven attentional movement to the Xash indeed does occur. Our demonstration of such a bottom-up attentional process complements Namba and Baldo's (2004) recent Wnding that manipulating top-down attentional processes changes the magnitude of the Xash-lag illusion. More generally, our Wnding that the Xash aVected the perception of the position of the moving object complements Whitney and Cavanagh's (2000a) Wnding that a moving stimulus aVects the perceived position of an adjacent Xashed object, as well as that of other moving objects (Whitney & Cavanagh, 2002) .
The role of uncertainty and its inverse, predictability, has been a focus in a number of recent studies of the Xash-lag illusion (Kanai et al., 2004; Vreven & Verghese, 2005) , the general Wnding being that increasing the uncertainty, or decreasing the predictability, of the stimuli increased the magnitude of the Xash-lag illusion. It may be that the Xash's existence in our irrelevant Xash conditions disrupts the perception of the moving object by increasing uncertainty regarding the moving object's position. Of course, this would occur not just in the Xash irrelevant conditions, but in all Xash-lag conditions and indeed in all other research that uses a Xash as a probe to ascertain the perceived position of a moving object. This may pose a quandary to psychophysicists similar to that faced by quantum physicists attempting to accurately measure the position of quantum objects, and quantiWed for them by the Uncertainty Principle (Eisberg & Resnick, 1985) . Using a Xash to probe the perception of a moving object's position introduces a stimulus which itself disrupts that perception, possibly unpredictably.
DiVerence between Xash-lag and Fröhlich illusions
We found the Xash-lag illusion to be signiWcantly larger than the Fröhlich illusion across both onset and reversal trajectories. The Wnding with the onset trajectory is in line with that of Müsseler et al. (2002) , but diVering from that of Whitney and Cavanagh (2000b) . Whitney and Cavanagh (2000b) utilized two moving objects, which appeared and moved oV in opposite directions, and the eVective Fröhlich illusion was measured by having participants report their alignment when they appeared. They moved horizontally, and their trajectories had a vertical separation of 7°, the Wxation point being at the mid-point of this vertical separation. In conditions where the Xash-lag illusion was measured, two Xashes appeared more peripherally than the moving objects, having a separation between them of 10.8° ( Whitney, personal communication, November, 2005) . All the stimuli thus were presented at greater eccentricity than ours. One possibility is that their more peripheral Xashes were more prone to being 'dragged' by the moving objects than ours (Whitney, personal communication, November, 2005 , Whitney & Cavanagh, 2000a . Also, our Xash being on the opposite side of Wxation to the moving object may have reduced motion-drag. Thus, Whitney and Cavanagh (2000b) may have under-estimated the Xash-lag illusion and hence not found it to have a larger magnitude than the Fröhlich illusion.
We introduced our landmark irrelevant Xash judgement conditions to see if attentional capturing properties of the Xash could account for any diVerence between the Fröhlich and Xash-lag illusions. Statistically we failed to Wnd a diVerence between our landmark irrelevant Xash and our Xashlag judgement conditions, 7 but bearing in mind the pattern of results in Fig. 2 we think it would be premature to claim that attentional capture accounts for all of the diVerence between the Fröhlich and Xash-lag illusions. Having said this, the Xash may be more attention capturing when it is task relevant, so we may also have under-estimated its contribution to the Xash-lag illusion. More work is needed to quantify the contribution of attentional capture.
An alternative account of the diVerence between these illusions might be that temporal integration underlies both illusions, but a diVerent window of integration is utilized in the Xash-lag paradigm such that the window begins later when a Xash-lag judgment is being made. This again could be related to the diVerential latency hypothesis-here in the form that the Xash is perceived with a greater latency than a moving object with an onset trajectory. The Xash being the cue to make the positional judgment of the moving object, a later window of integration would be used than if the onset of the moving object itself cued this judgment.
However, it seems to us that such an account would predict that the onset of the moving object would be perceived to occur temporally before a Xash, if they were displayed together. As already noted, Nijhawan et al. (2004) found the moving object to be perceived to occur signiWcantly after the Xash. The trend in our data did not disagree with this. Together, these results cast doubt on the ability of diVerential latency processes, even in combination with temporal integration, to account for our data, certainly with onset trajectories.
Comparison of Xash-lag illusions across trajectories
With regard to the Xash-lag illusion across trajectory types, we found that the magnitude was the same for straight-through and reversal trajectories, in agreement with previous work (Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000a) . However, Eagleman and Sejnowski's (2000a) Wnding that the magnitude is the same for straight-through and onset trajectories must now, we believe, be regarded as a Wrst approximation, as we have here replicated Ögmen et al. (2004) , Patel et al. (2000) and, albeit using a diVerent paradigm, Müsseler et al. (2002) , in Wnding that it is slightly, but reliably, larger eVect for an onset trajectory. In fact, Ögmen et al. (2004) repeatedly found this diVerence with a large range of moving object and Xash luminances, only failing to Wnd it when a dim Xash was used.
One reason why Eagleman and Sejnowski (2000a) may not have detected this diVerence is that they used an annular moving object, and their Xash was sized so that it could approximately Wll the interior of the annulus. Thus, the annulus swept through the same space the Xash occupied, and we would expect that this would exaggerate attentional, and in particular masking, eVects, probably in an unpredictable fashion from trial to trial. Such an additional source of random error would have made it more diYcult for them to detect diVerences between conditions. Also, with our eight participants, versus Eagleman and Sejnowski's (2000a) Wve, we had more power to Wnd a diVerence. Chappell and Hine (2004) found that displaying an about to-be-moving object stationary for a period of time before it moved oV, with a Xash appearing as it did so, reduced the Xash-lag eVect. In fact 750 ms of exposure to the stationary object reduced the Xash-lag eVect by about 20% compared to a condition where there was no such stationary exposure-a regular onset trajectory. This reduction is similar to the reduction in the current experiment from the onset to the straight-through or reversal trajectories (we also found the Xash-lag illusion to have a signiWcantly larger magnitude for the onset trajectory than for the reversal trajectory). This suggests that straight-through, reversal, and what we might term 'stationary before Xash' trajectories have very similar Xash-lag illusions. For all of these trajectories a representation for the moving object (although not including the motion attribute in the latter case) could be established before the Xash occurred. What may set the onset trajectory apart is that newly appearing moving objects may require additional attentional resources so that a representation may be established for them (Yantis, 1996) . Attention's return to the moving object might be additionally delayed with this trajectory, leading to a larger illusion.
Conclusions
Our results show that a full explanation of the Xash-lag illusion needs to take account of the attention-capturing, and possibly masking, eVect of the Xash (Baldo & Klein, 1995) . It cannot be considered a neutral Xag for making spatial and temporal judgements, given that the mere presence of a Xash alters the perception of the position of a moving object. Assuming a temporal integration process (Krekelberg & Lappe, 2000; Lappe & Krekelberg, 1998 ) is also operating allows most of our data to be accommodated, as long as the window of integration used by this process starts no sooner than the Xash (cf. Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000a) , or trajectory event. Such a placement might be a consequence of a diVerential latency between processing of Xashes and moving objects (Purushothaman et al., 1998; Whitney & Murakami, 1998) . We noted that an inhibitory process trailing a moving object (Fu et al., 2001; Kanai et al., 2004; Kirschfeld, 2006; Kirschfeld & Kammer, 1999; Sheth et al., 2000) would be able to mimic the outcomes from temporal integration, and might therefore replace it in a model. To account for all the results with the onset trajectory, though, additional processes attending the appearance of a moving object need to supplement such a model. With regard to the Xash-lag illusion, our results suggest that 46-47% of its magnitude may be accounted for by temporal integration or backward inhibition, and at least a further 17-18% by attentional processes, leaving up to a third of its magnitude caused by some as yet unidentiWed process.
